To show that a formula A is not provable in propositional classical logic, it su ces to exhibit a nite boolean model which does not satisfy A. A similar property holds in the intuitionistic case, with Kripke models instead of boolean models (see for instance TvD88]). One says that the propositional classical logic and the propositional intuitionistic logic satisfy a nite model property. In particular, they are decidable: there is a semi-algorithm for provability (proof search) and a semi-algorithm for non provability (model search). For that reason, a logic which is undecidable, such as rst order logic, cannot satisfy a nite model property.
To show that a formula A is not provable in propositional classical logic, it su ces to exhibit a nite boolean model which does not satisfy A. A similar property holds in the intuitionistic case, with Kripke models instead of boolean models (see for instance TvD88]). One says that the propositional classical logic and the propositional intuitionistic logic satisfy a nite model property. In particular, they are decidable: there is a semi-algorithm for provability (proof search) and a semi-algorithm for non provability (model search). For that reason, a logic which is undecidable, such as rst order logic, cannot satisfy a nite model property.
The case of linear logic is more complicated. The full propositional fragment LL has a complete semantics in terms of phase spaces Gir87, Gir95] , but it is undecidable LMSS92]. The multiplicative additive fragment MALL is decidable, in fact PSPACE-complete LMSS92], but the decidability of the multiplicative exponential fragment MELL is still an open problem. For a ne logic, that is, linear logic with weakening, the situation is somewhat better: the full propositional fragment LLW is decidable Kop95a] .
Here, we show that the nite phase semantics is complete for MALL and for LLW, but not for MELL. In particular, this gives a new proof of the decidability of LLW. The noncommutative case is mentioned, but not handled in detail. It is possible to show that the inclusion of this lemma is in fact an equality (see Gir87]), but the nice point about this proof is that it does not use the cut rule (see also Oka94]). The following theorem summarizes three properties: soundness of the phase semantics, completeness of the phase semantics, and cut elimination.
Theorem 1. For any formula A in MALL, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) A is provable in MALL;
(2) A is satis ed by all phase models;
(3) A is satis ed by MALL ; (4) A is provable in cut-free MALL.
Proof. (2) implies (3) and (4) implies (1) trivially.
(1) implies (2) by induction on proofs, as in Gir87], and (3) implies (4) by lemma 1.
The soundness of the phase semantics has been used in Laf95] , to show that second order multiplicative additive logic is undecidable, and subsequently in LS95, Kan95, Kop95b] , to show that various fragments of second order linear logic are undecidable. 
Semantics of exponentials
If M is a phase space, it is easy to see that J(M) = fx 2 1 ; x 2 fx 2 g ?? g is a submonoid of M. An enriched phase space is a phase space M endowed with a submonoid K of J(M). This K is not required to be a fact. For instance, K may be f1g, or J(M) itself, or I(M) = fx 2 1 ; x = x 2 g. In the latter case, one From these de nitions, one deduces easily, for any facts X and X 1 ; : : : ; X n : !X X; !X !X !X; !X 1 ; !X 1 !X n !X whenever !X 1 !X n X:
From now on, all phase models are supposed to be enriched. The syntactical model LL is de ned as follows: LL is the free commutative monoid generated by all formulas in LL; ? is the set of all provable sequents in cut-free LL; = f g ? for any positive atom ; K is the submonoid of LL generated by all formulas of the form ?A.
By contraction and weakening, K is indeed a submonoid of J(M). Moreover, the analogue of lemma 1 holds:
Lemma 3. For The other cases are handled as in lemma 1. From this lemma, one deduces the analogue of theorem 1, and in particular, the completeness of the phase semantics for LL. Similarly, one shows the completeness of the nitely generated phase semantics, but not the completeness of the nite phase semantics: if one extends v to LL in such a way that the premises of a logical rule are always smaller than its conclusion, then it is no more the case that there are nitely Theorem 3. ' is satis ed by all nite phase models, but it is not provable.
Proof. One writes b n for b b (n times). If M is a nite phase model, there are nitely many facts in M, so that (b p ) = (b q ) for some p < q. In particular, the formula = b p ? b q is satis ed by M, and since it is easy to see that the formula ? ' is provable, ? ' is also satis ed by M, and so is '. To see that ' is not provable, consider the following in nite phase model:
M is the free group generated by the symbol a. This means that any element of M can be uniquely written as a n with n 2 Z; ? = fa n ; n 0g, a = fag ? = fa n ; n ?1g, b = fa ?1 g ? = fa n ; n 1g, and K = f1g. It is easy to see that 1 = 2 ' = b , which means that ' is not satis ed. In fact, ' belongs to the so-called multiplicative exponential Horn fragment of linear logic, which encodes the reachability problem for Petri nets. This means that this fragment does not satisfy the nite model property, whereas it is decidable.
If is a logical congruence on a phase model M, then K is not necessarily closed for , but one can always replace K by its closure K = fx 2 M; x y for some y 2 Kg. It is indeed easy to see that, for any fact X, one has (X \ K) ? = (X \ K) ? . Moreover, (K) = (K) (J(M)) = J(M= ), so that induces a structure of enriched phase space on M= , and the analogue of lemma 2 holds for LL. For instance, the smallest congruence such that ?A ?A; ?A for any A is a logical congruence on LL , and K is already closed for . In that case, (K) = I(LL = ), and since LL = satis es the same formulas as LL , one gets the completeness of Girard's phase semantics for LL Gir95] . Note that Girard's phase semantics is not closed under quotient by a logical congruence, because it is not true in general that (I(M)) = I(M= ).
Semantics of affine logic
If M is a commutative monoid, an ideal of M is an X M such that XM X, or equivalently, XM = X. Clearly, X ? Y is an ideal whenever Y is an ideal, and any union of ideals is an ideal. Say that an ideal is principal if it is of the form xM for some x 2 M, and say that it is of nite type if it is a nite union of principal ideals. Finally, say that M is noetherian if all its ideals are of nite type. We shall need the following classical result, which is also crucial in Kop95a]:
Lemma 4. Any nitely generated free commutative monoid is noetherian. Proof. Such a monoid is isomorphic to N k with addition, and an ideal of N k is a subset of N k which is upwards closed for the usual ordering. N is clearly noetherian: its ideals are empty or principal. To see that N 2 is noetherian, consider an ideal X of N 2 . If X is nonempty, one can choose (p; q) 2 X, and one has
where X 0 is the principal ideal generated by (p; q), Y i = fn 2 N; (i; n) 2 Xg, and Z j = fn 2 N; (n; j) 2 Xg. Since the Y i and the Z j are ideals of the noetherian monoid N, one sees easily that X is of nite type. More generally, one proves that N k is noetherian by induction on k.
An a ne phase space is a phase space M such that ? is an ideal of M, or equivalently, 1 = M. In that case, all facts of M are ideals, and M satis es all formulas which are provable in LLW, that is, LL extended with the (structural) weakening rule:`?
A; ?
The syntactical model LLW is an a ne phase model. Again, one shows the analogue of theorem 1, and the completeness of the nitely generated a ne phase semantics. More precisely, a formula A is provable in LLW if and only if A is satis ed by the phase model LLW A] whose underlying monoid is a nitely generated free commutative monoid.
Lemma 5. If M is an a ne phase model whose underlying monoid is a nitely generated free commutative monoid, then M= is nite. Proof. We can assume that the underlying monoid is N k with addition. By lemma 4, ? = i=1;:::;n fx 2 N k ; x u i g for some u 1 ; : : : ; u n 2 N k . Therefore, fxg ? is completely determined by x 0 = inf(x; sup(u 1 ; : : : ; u n )). Since there are nitely many such x 0 , this means that M= is nite. This lemma allows to prove the following theorem, which gives the completeness of the nite a ne phase semantics for LLW. In particular, LLW is decidable. Theorem 4. For any formula A in LL, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) A is provable in LLW;
(2) A is satis ed by all nite a ne phase models; 
